In Defense of Fanaticism

Ethics 132 (2):445-477 (2022)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Which is better: a guarantee of a modest amount of moral value, or a tiny probability of arbitrarily large value? To prefer the latter seems fanatical. But, as I argue, avoiding such fanaticism brings severe problems. To do so, we must decline intuitively attractive trade-offs; rank structurally identical pairs of lotteries inconsistently, or else admit absurd sensitivity to tiny probability differences; have rankings depend on remote, unaffected events ; and often neglect to rank lotteries as we already know we would if we learned more. Compared to these implications, fanaticism is highly plausible.

Analytics

Added to PP
2020-10-30

Downloads
1,175 (#11,099)

6 months
270 (#8,845)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Hayden Wilkinson
University of Oxford

Citations of this work

Infinite Aggregation and Risk.Hayden Wilkinson - 2023 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 101 (2):340-359.
Fixing Stochastic Dominance.Jeffrey Sanford Russell - forthcoming - The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.

View all 34 citations / Add more citations