Abstract

Aquinas' teaching on human freedom and free will is contextually interwoven with another closely related, though nonetheless, a distinct metaphysical doctrine--the theory of the radical orientation of all things to the last end. This orientation, or the inclination of the "will as nature", is the principle and the foundation of all the subsequent operations of the human will. Even the free act of the human agent therefore, necessarily and ontologically depends on the prior tendency of the will. ;This ontological dependency of the act of self-determination on the God-determined bent of the will has been diversely understood, interpreted, and criticised. For some Thomists, it is apparently the explanation of human freedom. On the other hand, critics detect in this manner of explaining freedom, the reduction of the human subject to a "part of nature". Consequently, there is need to spell out with utmost precision the essential role of the primary tendency of the will. ;To answer this need is the principal objective of the present study. After identifying the primary sense of libertas in St. Thomas as "the natural freedom of self-determination", we have through the analysis of Aquinas' texts shown the originating basis of the natural inclination of the will to be the "act of being". This in turn facilitates the determination of the essential role of this same inclination as the provision of the ACTUALITY of an activity of "will as will". ;Indirectly, too, the fundamental bent of the will is shown not to be the explanation of human freedom. To demonstrate this explanation, we have systematically exposed the metaphysical nature and structure of the human soul or natural form of man. The soul is the ultimate source and explanation of human freedom. This is perhaps Aquinas' strongest, though seldom cited, proof for the freedom of man. ;At the end of this inquiry, it is hoped that there is now a more comprehensive account of St. Thomas's doctrine of human freedom, than is generally available. It is also hoped that the way is paved for meeting several contemporary objections or questions directed against his philosophy of human freedom