Abstract

In this dissertation I defend St. Thomas Aquinas' reconciliation of divine will and human freedom against the claim of Louis de Molina and several twentieth century Molinist philosophers that Aquinas is a divine determinist. Although it is true that Aquinas argues that God's knowledge is the cause of all things, Aquinas maintains that God's eternal and omniscient will does not usurp human freedom but guarantees it, for God wills that rational beings act freely, that is without necessity. Aquinas contends that this divine, non-deterministic operation is possible only because God is the Creator, who transcends the normal categories of time, necessity and contingency. ;Chapter One describes the remarkable depth in which Aquinas believes in the total sovereignty of God's will. Chapter Two presents the central claim of his reconciliation of the divine will and human freedom, namely, that God wills some things to happen contingently. It also explains Aquinas' understanding of secondary causality and the difference between absolute and conditional necessity. Chapter Three reveals how Aquinas' reconciliation grew out of the solutions offered by Aristotle, Augustine and Boethius concerning the related problem of divine foreknowledge. ;Chapter Four presents two arguments that claim Aquinas is a divine determinist. The first is championed by Louis de Molina and supported by Thomas Flint and Alfred Freddoso who argue that Aquinas' understanding of eternity entails determinism. The second belongs to William Craig, who argues that Aquinas' confidence that God's knowledge and will is the cause of all things, including the choices of the human will, means that he also believes human freedom is an illusion. ;Chapter Five proves Aquinas is not a divine determinist by correcting several Molinist misconceptions about Aquinas' understanding of eternity and God's foreknowledge. Chapter Six argues against Craig, revealing that God's transcendent act of creation ensures both providence and human freedom because His will not only causes each rational being to be, but causes each rational being to be a free cause