The paper deals with the problem of divine causation in relation to created agents in general and human rational agents in particular. Beyond creation and conservation, Aquinas specifies divine contribution to created agents’ operation as application in the role of the first cause and the operation of the principal cause employing an instrumental cause. It is especially the latter which is open to varying interpretation and which might be potentially threatening to human freedom. There are different readings of what it (...) is for the secondary agent to “act through the power of the principal cause”. Either the divine cause causes only the existence of the effect of the secondary cause, or it also causes the cause to operate in the sense that it determines its outcome. The latter seems to contradict human freedom. Both readings of Aquinas were developed in the latter half of the sixteenth century within scholastic philosophy and theology. (shrink)

The paper outlines the understanding of emergence in Ontic Structural Realism of James Ladyman (and his co-author Ross). First, the notion of emergence is explored, surveying the various distinctions associated with it (ontological vs. epistemological, diachronic vs. synchronic, weak vs. strong). It turns out that Ross and Ladyman’s notion of emergence is that of weak epistemological emergence compatible with ontic reduction. Particular notions of emergence are associated with the objection embodied in the Generalized Causal Exclusion Argument. The latter is sketched (...) and the solution of Ross and Ladyman is presented: first, in general, the notion of weak emergence is not threatened by this objection. Causal reduction associated with it ensures that there are no competing causal explanations, so no overdetermination arises. Second, there is a peculiar feature of Ross and Ladyman’s theory; namely, there is no causation on the fundamental level, only pattern dynamism. Causation emerges only on higher levels of special sciences. Hence, there is no problem of causal overdetermination. (shrink)

The paper explores two avenues to the union of the believer with God in Thomas Aquinas inspired by Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite; namely, the intellectual union in faith through the gift of understanding and the union in charity as the basis for the knowledge associated with the gift of wisdom. The former amounts to an intellectual grasp of revealed truths without full understanding of the terms used (without the apprehension of the essences), yet with a clear understanding of what would be (...) erroneous interpretations and meanings. The latter is an (quasi-)experimental knowledge of God based on connaturality with him due to the infused virtue of charity. Both kinds of knowledge or “mystical theology” are open to any believer in the state of sanctifying grace and are its effects. (shrink)

The paper deals with various species of fatalism originating either in causal determinism, in the semantic fact that propositions about the future may be true in the present, or in divine omniscience. The common argument form is identified as well as the relevant notion of modality at play, that of power necessity. Finally, the paper examines briefly a strategy to combat theological fatalism, the socalled Ockhamism and various attempts to disprove the underlying transfer principle (of power necessity).

The paper deals with various species of fatalism originating either in causal determinism, in the semantic fact that propositions about the future may be true in the present, or in divine omniscience. The common argument form is identified as well as the relevant notion of modality at play, that of power necessity. Finally, the paper examines briefly a strategy to combat theological fatalism, the socalled Ockhamism and various attempts to disprove the underlying transfer principle (of power necessity).

Článek z oblasti analytické metafyziky se věnuje problému, zda vágní objekty implikují vágní identitu. Pokud by tomu tak bylo, pak lze s Evansem argumentovat tak, že nemohou existovat, protože vágní identita vede k nekoherenci. Studie představuje argument pro zmíněnou implikaci a ukazuje, jak se jeho závěru vyhnout. Evansův argument předpokládá, že jména v tvrzeních o neurčité identitě referují určitě. Nejlepší cesta, jak se celému problému vyhnout, je tedy ukázat, že vágní objekty sice implikují vágní identitu, ale v takových tvrzeních o (...) identitě vystupují výrazy, které nereferují určitě. Tím vyřešíme i námitku, že sice tvrzení o identitě mezi vágním objektem a jeho přesnou realizací není neurčité, ale neurčité je tvrzení o identitě dvou vágních objektů. (shrink)

Článek souhrnně odpovídá na vybrané podněty a námitky čtyř textů, jež polemizují s některými aspekty Dvořákovy knihy Kauzalita činitele. Ve vztahu k článku J. Peregrina vysvětluje, proč nelze přijmout jeho řešení antinomie mezi svobodným rozhodováním a determinismem oddělením dvou druhů jazyků či výkladových rámců. Kritiku S. Sousedíka Dvořák považuje za založenou na příliš úzkém pojetí schopnosti. Odmítá to, že by z pojmu schopnosti plynulo, že ta může být determinována pouze něčím jiným, než je její nositel. Podstatnou část námitky D. Peroutky (...) Dvořák přijímá a upřesňuje, nakolik je existence alternativních možností nutnou podmínkou svobodného charakteru rozhodování. Konečně, v polemice s V. Punčochářem se Dvořák snaží vyložit, ve kterém smyslu náhoda ruší svobodu a ve kterém nikoliv. Dále, autor nepovažuje epistemické alternativy za dostatečné pro skutečnou svobodu rozhodování. (shrink)

The article deals with various modal versions of the ontological argument from N. Malcolm’s to P. Tichý’s interpretation of Anselm’s second proof. Three key presuppositions of the modal proof are pin-pointed and examined. The principal problem with the proof seems to be the notion of necessary existence attributed to God. More precisely, the question is whether this is not too strong an attribute, for then there would not be a situation, i.e. a possible world, consistently thinkable which precludes the existence (...) of God. However, this seems to be wrong. (shrink)

The article deals with various modal versions of the ontological argument from N. Malcolm’s to P. Tichý’s interpretation of Anselm’s second proof. Three key presuppositions of the modal proof are pin-pointed and examined. The principal problem with the proof seems to be the notion of necessary existence attributed to God. More precisely, the question is whether this is not too strong an attribute, for then there would not be a situation, i.e. a possible world, consistently thinkable which precludes the existence (...) of God. However, this seems to be wrong. (shrink)

[The Molinist theory of the relation of divine prescience and human freedom in late Scholasticism and current analytic philosophy].

The paper deals with the problem whether there can exist indeterminate identity. If one accepts Evans’s argument, then statements about indeterminate identity can be true, but only those, in which at least one of the singular terms does not refer determinately. One does not have to explain all vagueness as semantic, i.e. as indeterminacy of meaning, because some such statements can be true on account of indeterminacy of reality. This can be shown in the particular quantum case introduced by Lowe (...) concerning the identity of an absorbed and emitted electron. The singular terms within the identity statements in this example are to be understood in the way pointed out by Abasnezhad and in the manner Barnes and Williams take names in statements of identity between Kilimanjaro and one of the precise aggregates of particles of which the mountain consists: One of the names refers indeterminately. This indeterminacy is of the kind belonging to indefinite descriptions. The issue of individuality on quantum level can be understood using resources of structural realism of James Ladyman. (shrink)

The paper attempts to interpret P. van Inwagen’s refutation of Evans’ argument that there cannot be vague objects and defend it against the charge of inconsistency raised by Radim Bělohrad. However, such an interpretation is not without a cost. Therefore another interpretation of van Inwagen’s example of the Cabinet is offered which evades Evans’ charge of inconsistency against indeterminate identity as it does not need the notion at all.

The article is a presentation of the Thomist response to Scotist criticism of analogy; namely, the defense of St. Thomas’ teaching in some leading renaissance and post-renaissance Thomists: Thomas de Vio, better known as Cajetan, Sylvester of Ferrara, John Versor and John of Saint Thomas. The author first explains the general core of the semantic doctrine of analogy and outlines the basic terminology. Then he exposes the way Cajetan and other Thomists knit Aquinas’ dispersed remarks on analogy into a systematic (...) doctrinal whole. (shrink)

The article is a presentation of the Thomist response to Scotist criticism of analogy; namely, the defense of St. Thomas’ teaching in some leading renaissance and post-renaissance Thomists: Thomas de Vio, better known as Cajetan, Sylvester of Ferrara, John Versor and John of Saint Thomas. The author first explains the general core of the semantic doctrine of analogy and outlines the basic terminology. Then he exposes the way Cajetan and other Thomists knit Aquinas’ dispersed remarks on analogy into a systematic (...) doctrinal whole. (shrink)

[Aquinas and Cajetan on the analogy of names].

The paper deals with Aristotle’s argument against determinism and in favor of contingency in nature as interpreted by Thomas Aquinas. The case against determinism is based on the idea that there are properly uncaused accidental events in reality. This means that in case there is some coincidental future event e, one cannot trace an unbroken causal chain leading to e back to the present or the past. For a Christian Aristotelian, such as Aquinas, there arises a difficulty concerning divine foreknowledge (...) and volitional determination of events of this sort. Thomas’s solution is based on the claim that the latter divine acts are not within the scope of modal determination (necessity/contingency). (shrink)

The article introduces and defends Aristotelian ontological theory of the possible as that which a power is capable of bringing about. It regards this conception to be a sort of middle way between Platonic explanation based on abstracta on one hand and the possibilist theory ultimately making everything possible into actual on the other. The doctrine defended leads to the conception of necessary being. Combined with other assumptions concerning this being, there arise some interesting issues and apparent tensions to be (...) resolved. The article outlines some of the discussions related to these problems in medieval and early modern Scholasticism. (shrink)

The well-known Ratio Studiorum of 1599 states that logical instruction should follow F. Toletus or P. Fonseca. The latter authored the famous Institutionum Dialecticarum Libri Octo, the former a similar manual, Introductio in Dialecticam Aristotelis. As is often observed, the contrast between the Aristotelian and present symbolic logics is perhaps most striking in their analysis of relational statements. Both authors recognize the relational logical form as independent from the traditional subject-predicate form and see the need to recognize relational inferential rules. (...) They differ in their specific rules, however, so neither of the authors has captured the system of relational syllogism in its entirety. (shrink)

The well-known Ratio Studiorum of 1599 states that logical instruction should follow F. Toletus or P. Fonseca. The latter authored the famous Institutionum Dialecticarum Libri Octo, the former a similar manual, Introductio in Dialecticam Aristotelis. As is often observed, the contrast between the Aristotelian and present symbolic logics is perhaps most striking in their analysis of relational statements. Both authors recognize the relational logical form as independent from the traditional subject-predicate form and see the need to recognize relational inferential rules. (...) They differ in their specific rules, however, so neither of the authors has captured the system of relational syllogism in its entirety. (shrink)

The article is a critical systematic presentation of R. M. Hare's ethical concepts and doctrine as outlined in his books The Language of Morals (1952) and Freedom and Reason (1963). The theory merits attention for many reasons, yet it appears to suffer from some weaknesses; the chief among them being the lack of explanation for the source of binding force of moral principles.

Gabriel Vásquez discusses two deterministic arguments ascribed to John Wyclif. He appeals to the Anselmian solution based on the distinction between two types of necessity: antecedent and subsequent necessity. Unlike the former, the latter necessity does not destroy future event’s contingency, which is required if it is to result from a free choice. The paper discusses the Aristotelian objection according to which a statement describing some contingent future event is either without truth-value, and thus antecedently contingent but not subsequently necessary (...) at present, or it has a truth-value, but then it is not merely subsequently necessary but also antecedently necessary. The Anselmian temporal ontology is such that no absolute present parameter is to be included in the evaluation of modal tensed statements. This recognition disposes of modal notions tied to the absolute temporal qualification of statements and thus undercuts the objection. (shrink)

The article is a presentation of the Thomist response to Scotist criticism of analogy; namely, the defense of St. Thomas’ teaching in some leading renaissance and post-renaissance Thomists: Thomas de Vio, better known as Cajetan, Sylvester of Ferrara, John Versor and John of Saint Thomas. The author first explains the general core of the semantic doctrine of analogy and outlines the basic terminology. Then he exposes the way Cajetan and other Thomists knit Aquinas’ dispersed remarks on analogy into a systematic (...) doctrinal whole. (shrink)