The Role of Kant’s Refutation of Idealism

Southern Journal of Philosophy 29 (1):51-67 (1991)
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Abstract

This paper argues that the Refutation of Idealism is a clear development of a line of thought expressed in the Transcendental Deduction and the Fourth Paralogism in the 1781-edition of the Critique of Pure Reason. This general line of thought is that the possibility of systematic delusion about the nature of the empirical world is ruled out, in part, by the fact that illusion presupposes a background of veridical perception.

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Michael Hymers
Dalhousie University

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