Abstract

This dissertation examines the tension in the ethics of G. E. Moore arising from his dual role of revolutionary and conservative. He is revolutionary in arguing that all ethicists until Sidgwick have made an elementary error; conservative in returning them to their common sense awareness of good, which, despite their confusions, they never completely lost. We raise and resolve the following questions: If common sense ethical awareness is well-grounded and ethicists never completely lose it, why have they gone so far astray? If they have gone astray, how can Moore be hopeful of delivering them of their errors? We argue that Moore overestimates the revolutionary features of his thought. We make him less revolutionary and more convincing by enriching his methodology and also by fleshing out his moral psychology. We effect the latter task by examining and elaborating on his views on the connection of desire and the will to good. Finally, however, Moore's argument against ethical egoism makes him an extreme revolutionary and no friend of common sense