Abstract

More importantly, I defend Moore from the charge that his demonstration proofs beg the question against the skeptic. I produce an argument drawn from Moore's work that we do know the premises of his demonstration proofs and that we do have common sense knowledge. I also answer the charge that Moore misses Descartes' point. I argue that Descartes' primary concern is not to conclude that we cannot know empirical facts, but to explain how we know them. I show that Moore, himself, is concerned with this second issue, especially in his analysis of perception. ;I conclude that Moore's demonstration proofs are good proofs and that he provides a unique and illuminating response to skepticism. For Moore's work shows--in contrast with what many common sense philosophers believe--that the skeptic raises important questions about knowledge and that, although these questions are difficult to answer, they are nonparadoxical. ;I defend Moore against some of the most important attacks on his defence of common sense. I argue, against Norman Malcolm, that the statements in Moore's demonstration proofs are meaningful and state common sense beliefs. I answer the charge that Moore's theory of perception entails that we do not really see physical objects or that we do not see them in the way we think we do. And I show that Moore's theory does not lead to skepticism about our knowledge of the external world. ;The aim of this dissertation is to set forth and assess Moore's defence of the common sense views that the external world exists and that we know it does. ;I argue that Moore's defence has two parts, which I set forth in detail. In the first he presents common sense demonstration proofs, such as "Here is one hand and here is another, therefore two human hands exist and at least two physical objects exist." In the second he analyzes perception in order to explain how we know propositions, such as "Here is a hand." He never completes this second part of his defence of common sense, but he does determine that seeing involves the direct apprehension of sense data and that knowledge of empirical propositions is based on the direct apprehension of sense data