Scepticism, Common Sense and Practice

Modern Philosophy 4:101-106 (2007)
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Abstract

Articles followed by analysis and comparison of Moore, Malcolm and Wittgenstein's response to skepticism and their way of argument skills, demonstrated knowledge of the extent to which the foundation gives way to avoid skepticism. Article that Moore and Malcolm's argument is inadequate, Wittgenstein on grammar distinction between propositions and empirical propositions of which the missing part of the supplement, which is the role of a game misplaced argument. This means that, to avoid skepticism is a practical attitude. In this essay I compare GE Moore, Malcolm, and Wittgenstein in their way against scepticism, and show that in what sense common sense can offer a foundation to avoid scepticism. I maintain that Moore's and Malcolm's arguments are both insufficient and should be supplemented with Wittgenstein's distinction, supported by the argument from ill-formed language game, between grammar propositions and empirical propositions. That means, it is some practical attitude that can avoid skepticism

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