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Why contextual preference reversals maximize expected value
Psychological Review 123 (4):368-391 (2016)
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Citations of this work
Can resources save rationality? ‘Anti-Bayesian’ updating in cognition and perception.Eric Mandelbaum, Isabel Won, Steven Gross & Chaz Firestone - 2020 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 143:e16.
A rational reinterpretation of dual-process theories.Smitha Milli, Falk Lieder & Thomas L. Griffiths - 2021 - Cognition 217 (C):104881.
The Parts of an Imperfect Agent.Sara Aronowitz - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Mind.
VAMP (Voting Agent Model of Preferences): A computational model of individual multi-attribute choice.Anouk S. Bergner, Daniel M. Oppenheimer & Greg Detre - 2019 - Cognition 192 (C):103971.
References found in this work
Bayesian Rationality: The Probabilistic Approach to Human Reasoning.Mike Oaksford & Nick Chater - 2007 - Oxford University Press.
A rational analysis of the selection task as optimal data selection.Mike Oaksford & Nick Chater - 1994 - Psychological Review 101 (4):608-631.
Decision field theory: A dynamic-cognitive approach to decision making in an uncertain environment.Jerome R. Busemeyer & James T. Townsend - 1993 - Psychological Review 100 (3):432-459.
The time course of perceptual choice: The leaky, competing accumulator model.Marius Usher & James L. McClelland - 2001 - Psychological Review 108 (3):550-592.
Elimination by aspects: A theory of choice.Amos Tversky - 1972 - Psychological Review 79 (4):281-299.
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