Conceivability, Possibility, and the Mind-Body Problem

Philosophical Review 108 (4):497-528 (1999)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Jennifer Hornsby’s Simple Mindedness consists of twelve essays organized into sections focusing on three issues: the ontology of persons and mental events, how actions fit into a world of natural law, and the nature of intentional explanations. Most of the essays have been previously published but many of these are revised and include addenda. The collection is unified by its defending a position in the philosophy of mind Hornsby calls “naive naturalism.” She advertises naive naturalism as neither physicalist nor Cartesian. Hornsby claims that the mind-body problem as currently discussed, that is, the question of how the mind fits into nature, arises because contemporary analytic philosophers have an overly scientistic view of nature restricting their concept of nature to whatever can be the proper subject matter of science. In her view, if naive naturalism were adopted, the mind-body problem, as it is currently discussed, would disappear. Hornsby is thus a member of that venerable tradition of English philosophers who see the mind-body problem as arising through an excessive fascination with science.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 93,069

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2011-01-09

Downloads
50 (#327,252)

6 months
15 (#185,003)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

Consciousness.Robert van Gulick - 2004 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Functionalism.Janet Levin - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Knowing What It's Like.Andrew Y. Lee - 2023 - Philosophical Perspectives 37 (1):187-209.

View all 12 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references