Abstract

The following questions constitute the core of the problem of the unity of the self as I approach it. What is the self which is postulated as the principle of unity underlying subjective experiences, i.e., thoughts, memories, emotions, etc.? How does the self occasion such a unity of experiences? What constitutes the identity of the self? What justification is there for positing a conception of the self? ;I approach the problem of the unity of the self from the standpoint of its original setting. That is, I first offer a careful exposition and critical appraisal of the problem's inception in the philosophy of Descartes. He conceives the self as a substance whose essential attribute is thought. While I defend his conception against the criticisms of such philosophers as Russell, A. J. Ayer, and Hume, I argue that it is inadequate since it cannot accommodate certain common beliefs concerning the self. ;Following my discussion of Descartes' conception of the self, I turn to the immediate response it received from Locke, Berkeley, and Hume. I argue that for Locke the self is constituted by consciousness and self-identity consists in the continuity of consciousness. I maintain that on his view memory plays an epistemic role in self-identity, and that it does not, as such critics of Locke as Reid, Flew, and Bernard Williams suppose, constitute it. While I endorse certain features of Locke's theory of the self, I argue that it is problematic due to the tension that exists between self-identity and a person's responsibility for his actions. Concerning Berkeley on the self, I support the view that for him the self is a perceiving, active spiritual substance. I maintain that his conception of the self is tenable as far as it goes, and I attempt to show that, contrary to the claim of some critics of Berkeley, it is not illegitimately introduced into his philosophy. . . . UMI