Intentionality, Time, and Self-Identity: Husserl's Theory of Time and the Problem of Personal Identity
Dissertation, Southern Illinois University at Carbondale (
1990)
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Abstract
In this dissertation I raise three questions: What is Husserl's theory of time?; Can we develop a particular thesis of self-identity and, if so, what would it look like?; How does the thesis work in relation to the problems that are to be solved? ;In chapter II, I give an exposition of Husserl's view on time with the purpose of establishing a framework that will play a decisive role in the formation of a thesis of self-identity. Husserl defines time as retentional-protentional acts of intentionality, which is to say that time constitutes its own flow, on the one hand, by transcending what is immediately given, while, on the other hand, by continuously retaining what is not given in the primal present. In this continuous self-synthesizing process there emerges an absolute individuality of consciousness which cannot be represented as an object of reflection. It cannot, therefore, be apprehended by knowledge based on memory. ;This fact is exploited in chapter III where I attempt to establish a thesis of self-identity, namely, that the self is an intentional self-synthesizer, or that the identity of the self consists in the identity, within a retentional-protentional schema, of consciousness throughout the past and the future. In this chapter I also show that the self as characterized by our phenomenological thesis cannot be equated with an atemporal, immutable entity as claimed by the Substance theory; nor can it be reduced to a bare collection of atomic perceptions as claimed by the Bundle theory. ;Finally, in chapter IV, I show that the proposed thesis does the work needed in the context of the problem of personal identity, through an interpretation of John Locke's seminal theory of the identity of persons. I argue that the thesis is not only valid in the concrete issues of personal identity but is also indispensable for understanding Locke's original position which has, in general, been misunderstood. In defending Locke's view I especially direct the criticism toward the Memory theory, the dominant interpretation of Locke, by making use of some critically important elements of Husserl's philosophy