Searle's vision of psychology

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):608-610 (1990)
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Author's Profile

James Higginbotham
PhD: Columbia University; Last affiliation: University of Southern California

Citations of this work

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Searle's argument that intentional states are conscious states.Norton Nelkin - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (3):614-615.

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