Abstract

Slife and Reber ask of psychologists that they recognize their prejudice against theism and the incompatibility between theistic and naturalistic worldviews. Yet, the subtext of their article is that theism and naturalism are equally valid and that psychology’s secularism is a mistake. Given that theism is not beyond reason, the only sufficient ground for charging psychologists with prejudice is if theism has survived serious attempts at conceptual and empirical test, and psychology ignores or disguises this fact. So, the grounds for believing in the reality of a supernatural existent are highly relevant to the authors’ allegation. However, their concept of God affords no such grounds. They disavow the logic involved in the ordinary meaning of the term “incompatible” and they ignore a crucial distinction between conditions of existence and qualities of things or processes. The consequence is that either God is this-worldly, and there is no ontological basis to Slife and Reber’s incompatibility thesis, or God’s mode of existence is quite different from the mode of existence of ordinary things and all the problems of dualism follow. Either way, their charge of prejudice is without foundation. The burden of proof rests with the defender of theism and, for now, psychology’s secularism can be considered a mark of the discipline’s rationality. 2012 APA, all rights reserved)