O uzasadnieniach przekonań religijnych

Roczniki Filozoficzne 56 (2):71-82 (2008)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Belief is a mental state, its content being the statement of a certain state of affairs. With respect to the manner they arise, we divide beliefs into spontaneous and reflexive. When we take into consideration their bases, we speak about basic beliefs and beliefs derived from others. The terms “spontaneous belief” and “basic belief” have various meanings, but they are equivalent with regard to their range. Contemporary religious spontaneous and basic beliefs have various forms. In the Christian religion we speak, among other things, about numinous beliefs, as described by R. Otto, and A. Plantinga’s properly basic beliefs. According to Otto, numinous experiences (of that which is tremendum et fascinans) are a source of firm beliefs for man, i.e. he has had contacts with some objective manifestations of divinity. Plantinga (whose thinking belongs to a more “naturalistic” strain) writes about properly basic beliefs, such that arise spontaneously in man (if he is not depraved by sinful life) who remains under respective circumstances. Such beliefs are the grounds for theistic derivative beliefs. The arguments for the truthfulness of the beliefs of the first and second type bring forth a series of questions, and they are constantly discussed by philosophers of religion

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,853

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Swinburne and Plantinga on internal rationality.Alvin Plantinga - 2001 - Religious Studies 37 (3):357-358.
The epistemology of belief.Hamid Vahid - 2009 - New York: Palgrave-Macmillan.
Liberal Fundamentalism and Its Rivals.Peter Graham - 2006 - In Jennifer Lackey & Ernest Sosa (eds.), The Epistemology of Testimony. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 93-115.
Foundationalism.Daniel Howard-Snyder - 2012 - In Andrew Cullison (ed.), The Continuum Companion to Epistemology. Continuum. pp. 37.
Intuitive and reflective beliefs.Dan Sperber - 1997 - Mind and Language 12 (1):67-83.
Niektóre filozoficzne problemy logik zmian przekonań.Marek Lechniak - 2005 - Roczniki Filozoficzne 53 (2):147-167.

Analytics

Added to PP
2013-05-27

Downloads
9 (#1,253,837)

6 months
2 (#1,198,779)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references