Topoi 26 (1):115-132 (2007)

Authors
Hannes Leitgeb
Ludwig Maximilians Universität, München
Abstract
On the basis of impossibility results on probability, belief revision, and conditionals, it is argued that conditional beliefs differ from beliefs in conditionals qua mental states. Once this is established, it will be pointed out in what sense conditional beliefs are still conditional, even though they may lack conditional contents, and why it is permissible to still regard them as beliefs, although they are not beliefs in conditionals. Along the way, the main logical, dispositional, representational, and normative properties of conditional beliefs are studied, and it is explained how the failure of not distinguishing conditional beliefs from beliefs in conditionals can lead philosophical and empirical theories astray.
Keywords Belief  Conditional  Belief revision  Conditionalization  Ramsey
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DOI 10.1007/s11245-006-9003-7
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References found in this work BETA

Counterfactuals.David Kellogg Lewis - 1973 - Cambridge, MA, USA: Blackwell.
Epistemology and Cognition.Alvin Ira Goldman - 1986 - Cambridge, MA, USA: Harvard University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Reasoning and Deducing.Markos Valaris - 2018 - Mind 128 (511):861-885.
Ranking Theory and Conditional Reasoning.Niels Skovgaard-Olsen - 2016 - Cognitive Science 40 (4):848-880.
On the Ramsey Test Without Triviality.Hannes Leitgeb - 2010 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 51 (1):21-54.
Inferential Seemings.Elijah Chudnoff - forthcoming - In Seemings: New Arguments, New Angles.

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