Can only one person be right? The development of objectivism and social preferences regarding widely shared and controversial moral beliefs

&
Cognition 167 (C):78-90 (2017)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

This article has no associated abstract. (fix it)

Categories

Add categories

Keywords

Reprint years

DOI

10.1016/j.cognition.2016.05.014

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 93,774

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

My notes

Similar books and articles

The Role of Moral Beliefs, Memories, and Preferences in Representations of Identity.Larisa Heiphetz, Nina Strohminger & Liane L. Young - 2016 - Cognitive Science 40 (7):744-767.
The Role of Moral Beliefs, Memories, and Preferences in Representations of Identity.Larisa Heiphetz, Nina Strohminger & Liane L. Young - 2017 - Cognitive Science 41 (3):744-767.
Who am I? The role of moral beliefs in children's and adults' understanding of identity.Larisa Heiphetz, Nina Strohminger, Susan Gelman & Liane L. Young - 2018 - Journal of Experimental Social Psychology:210-219.
Shared cultural knowledge: Effects of music on young children’s social preferences.Gaye Soley & Elizabeth S. Spelke - 2016 - Cognition 148 (C):106-116.
Children’s developing metaethical judgments.Marco F. H. Schmidt, Ivan Gonzalez-Cabrera & Michael Tomasello - 2017 - Journal of Experimental Child Psychology 164:163-177.
A Comparison of American and Nepalese Children's Concepts of Freedom of Choice and Social Constraint.Nadia Chernyak, Tamar Kushnir, Katherine M. Sullivan & Qi Wang - 2013 - Cognitive Science 37 (7):1343-1355.
Group identification, joint attention, and preferences: a cluster of minimal pre-conditions for joint actions.Alessandro Salice - forthcoming - Philosophical Psychology.
Why Moral Heuristics can Lead to Mistaken Moral Judgments.Vitaliy Nadurak - 2020 - Kriterion - Journal of Philosophy 34 (1):99-113.
Why Not the First-Person Plural in Social Cognition?Mattia Gallotti - 2013 - Behavioural and Brain Sciences 36 (4):422-423.
Why not the first-person plural in social cognition?Mattia Gallotti - 2013 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 36 (4):422-423.

Analytics

Added to PP
2017-11-08

Downloads
33 (#125,351)

6 months
14 (#987,135)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

View all 29 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

Moral relativism defended.Gilbert Harman - 1975 - Philosophical Review 84 (1):3-22.

View all 13 references / Add more references