Subjective Theories of Well-Being

In Ben Eggleston & Dale E. Miller (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Utilitarianism. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 199-219 (2014)
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Abstract

Subjective theories of well-being claim that how well our lives go for us is a matter of our attitudes towards what we get in life rather than the nature of the things themselves. This article explains in more detail the distinction between subjective and objective theories of well-being; describes, for each approach, some reasons for thinking it is true; outlines the main kinds of subjective theory; and explains their advantages and disadvantages.

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Chris Heathwood
University of Colorado, Boulder

Citations of this work

Against Welfare Subjectivism.Eden Lin - 2017 - Noûs 51 (2):354-377.
Desire-Fulfillment Theory.Chris Heathwood - 2015 - In Guy Fletcher (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Well-Being. New York,: Routledge. pp. 135-147.
Making desires satisfied, making satisfied desires.Alexander Dietz - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (3):979-999.
Hybrid Theories.Christopher Woodard - 2015 - In Guy Fletcher (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Well-Being. New York,: Routledge. pp. 161-174.
Can Subjectivism Account for Degrees of Wellbeing?Willem van der Deijl & Huub Brouwer - 2021 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 24 (3):767-788.

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References found in this work

Death.Thomas Nagel - 1970 - Noûs 4 (1):73-80.
Facts and Values.Peter Railton - 1986 - Philosophical Topics 14 (2):5-31.
What is this thing called happiness?Fred Feldman - 2010 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Desire satisfactionism and hedonism.Chris Heathwood - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 128 (3):539-563.
The reduction of sensory pleasure to desire.Chris Heathwood - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 133 (1):23-44.

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