The Relation Between Value and Existence in the Philosophies of Nicolai Hartmann and Alfred North Whitehead
Dissertation, Yale University (
1937)
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Abstract
We must therefore begin again from the metaphysical end of the main problem. We find in Whitehead's thought a picture of the kind of world in which value is possible, in which organic relatedness and continuity between diverse elements are made possible through "participation", through the agency of God. But we find that there is contradiction between his theory of value as atomic feeling and his whole metaphysics. True to our acceptance of "objectivity", we rather conceive value to be the source and goal of feeling, the "participation of reality in ideality, of individuality in community". Both the nature and function of God in the world suggest that he is the absolute value in terms of which and because of which all "relative values" are achieved. ;The problem of the relation of value and existence is one of the special problems of value-theory in general. But it is particularly central not only to axiology but also to ontology, and the relation of these two fields to one another. It is the problem of a contrast between "realms" of Being; we are asking ourselves in what ways the contrast arises and is felt, and whether it can be metaphysically overcome. ;We must begin with an analysis of the value-situation in empirical terms. Ethics, as a field of thought concerned with value-factors, may serve to present the typical problems of the relation of value to existence: the objectivity of value, arising from a consideration of the judgment and definition of value and also from the normative character of ethical principles; the apprehension of value, following upon our admission, with Hartmann, of "objectivity" to value; the realization of value, introduced by the previous two problems taken together and by the further conception of the place and function of man the subject-agent. Thus, though we begin with the "phenomena" we find we must go beyond them to the metaphysical reference which they themselves presuppose. We agree with Hartmann that value has "objectivity" and is genuinely given in and for knowledge; we do not however concur that "objectivity" necessarily implies "essentiality" in value