Abstract

Both the 18th century British moral sentiment theorists Hutcheson and Hume and the later continental moralists Kant, Brentano, and Scheler argued that we appreciate moral, aesthetic, and other values through feeling. This dissertation critically examines these "value-feeling" theories. I argue that positing a special value-feeling, like the moral sentiment, is not defensible; and I argue instead that we appreciate values through all the commonly recognized feelings, e.g., anger and despair. ;The first two chapters trace and evaluate the development of value-feeling theories from Hutcheson through Scheler. In Chapter One, an analysis of Hutcheson's inner sense theory sets up central problems for value-feeling theorists. Chapter Two evaluates Hume's, Kant's, Brentano's and Scheler's treatment of two main questions: How is it possible to appreciate values through feeling? And how should the assumed distinction between value-feelings and feelings which do not appreciate values be drawn? ;As it turns out, the philosophers considered lack a theory of feeling which adequately explains how feelings can appreciate values. In Chapter Three, I develop a new theory of feeling which turns on three claims: All feelings are in part appreciations of value. The content of the intentional objects of feeling includes value-qualities. Although having a cognitive function, feelings differ sharply from acts of "reason". ;In Chapter Four, I respond to the objection that feelings are too variable to be on the basis of our value-knowledge. Value-feeling theorists usually counter this by arguing that there are only a few value-feelings, and these are uniform. In contrast, I argue that all feelings are value-feelings; but these appreciate both "impersonal," shared values and "personal," individual values. Only when feeling appreciates impersonal values should we expect agreement among feelings and the value-judgments based on them