Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 10 (1):58-65 (2021)

Authors
Robert J. Hartman
Tulane University
Abstract
Some philosophers contend that concomitant ignorance preserves moral responsibility for wrongdoing. An agent is concomitantly ignorant with respect to wrongdoing if and only if her ignorance is non-culpable, but she would freely have performed the same action if she were not ignorant. I, however, argue that concomitant ignorance excuses. I show that leading accounts of moral responsibility imply that concomitant ignorance excuses, and I debunk the view that concomitant ignorance preserves moral responsibility
Keywords compatibilism  excuse  free will  ignorance  libertarianism  moral responsibility  moral luck  agent regret
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DOI 10.1002/tht3.481
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The Significance of Free Will.Robert Kane - 1996 - Oxford University Press USA.
Responsibility From the Margins.David Shoemaker - 2015 - Oxford University Press.

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