A Republican Argument Against Nudging and Informed Consent

HEC Forum 30 (3):267-282 (2018)
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Abstract

I argue that it is impermissible to use nudges as a tool to influence patients in the context of informed consent. The motivation for such nudges is that their use can help reconcile potential conflicts between a physician’s duty of beneficence and duty to respect patient autonomy. I argue that their use places physicians in a position of domination over patients. That is, it violates the republican freedom of patients because it grants physicians the power to arbitrarily interfere. I also argue that if one tries to adjust the duty of beneficence to avoid this conclusion, then the republican freedom of patients is still threatened under conditions of clinical equipoise. As ways to avoid the inevitability of nudging, I suggest the alternative of boosting or the pairing of patients with physicians who share their deep values. This latter option achieves the benefits nudging patients is supposed to provide without violating the republican freedom of those patients.

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References found in this work

Republicanism: a theory of freedom and government.Philip Pettit (ed.) - 1997 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government.Philip Pettit - 1999 - Philosophical Quarterly 49 (196):415-419.
Nudging and Informed Consent.Shlomo Cohen - 2013 - American Journal of Bioethics 13 (6):3-11.

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