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Sleeping Beauty Reconsidered: Conditioning and Reflection in Asynchronous Systems
In Tamar Szabo Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Proceedings of the Twentieth Conference on Uncertainty in Ai. Oxford University Press. pp. 111-142 (2004)
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Sleeping beauty and the dynamics of de se beliefs.Christopher J. G. Meacham - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 138 (2):245-269.
Ur-Priors, Conditionalization, and Ur-Prior Conditionalization.Christopher J. G. Meacham - 2016 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 3.
Updating as Communication.Sarah Moss - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2):225-248.
Self-location is no problem for conditionalization.Darren Bradley - 2011 - Synthese 182 (3):393-411.
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