Abstract

Contemporary debates about the role of the first‐person pronoun transpose onto a linguistic plane the discussion of the essential nature of a human being that stems from Cartesian metaphysics. Given the supposition that the word 'I' signifies a substance, it is perhaps understandable that Descartes had no qualms in using the expression “I”'. Hume's account earmarks the stalemate between rationalism and empiricism, as is evident in Reid's objection to the 'bundle theory': Whatever this self may be, it is something which thinks, and deliberates, and resolves, and acts and suffers. Wittgenstein approached the problems of the logical analysis of first‐person propositions through an investigation of the specific issue of belief‐sentences. Wittgenstein persisted in his efforts to clarify the philosophical problems about the nature of 'the self '. He agreed with Cartesians that 'I' is not used 'because we recognize a particular person by his bodily characteristics', a feature obvious in first‐person experiential propositions.