Abstract

Hume claims that internal character, rather than external, observable actions, is the object of our moral response. Character requires that there be something that is durable or lasting in a person, yet it seems that Hume's empiricism and his bundle theory of self would suggest that there can be no such durable thing underlying actions because, at its most basic, an appeal to character seems to presume a continuing self. However, I argue that Hume's shift from an attempt to find personal identity to his analysis of why we attribute a bundle-like unity to the discrete perceptions revealed by introspection is fundamental for an analysis of his account of character, for by showing us how we may use relations of causation and resemblance to explain our belief in a continued identity, Hume has shown us how we may go about creating a belief in a continued character. Using the model of attributed unity presented in the bundle theory, I provide an analysis of character which affirms its durability without conflicting with the skeptical conclusions drawn about an enduring self in Book I of the Treatise. Having thus explained character, I close by defending the importance of character in Hume's moral theory