Abstract

The Nietzschean inspiration in Reiner Schürmann’s thinking is considerable, and he acknowledged it openly. Indeed, in a number of ways he presents Nietzsche as a forerunner of most of his own themes: the pluralizing of the origin, the relativizing of law, the negation of every dominant arche, the refusal of goals or of conscious finality, the primacy of praxis over theoria, and the affirmation of ontological play, among others. Because his more hidden aim is to find a common ground between Heidegger and Nietzsche, it is difficult for him to give an account of Heidegger’s deconstruction of Nietzsche. But he utilizes a strategy that avoids openly disagreeing with Heidegger, which he rarely does. The strategy consists of arguing that Nietzsche’s fundamental concepts as interpreted by Heidegger do not actually refer to Nietzsche, but merely to modern technology. Heidegger’s texts on Nietzsche deal formally with Nietzsche, but materially with Technology. “Heidegger substitutes within the History of Being the technological moment for the Nietzschean moment.” It is not certain that this reading is compatible with Heidegger’s position on Nietzsche as an independent stage of metaphysics, and as the penultimate degree in the unfolding of the will to will. Schürmann jumps directly to the ultimate stage, in order, as it were, to “protect” Nietzsche from the deconstructive reading. He never comes to grips with the Heideggerian reading, because for him the Nietzschean concepts are used merely to describe the essence of Technology. Therefore, Schürmann simply leaves out all the “positive” or phenomenological interpretations of the Will to Power as affectivity or of the Eternal Return as “instant of vision” in Nietzsche I. He either ignores or does not see the doubleness of Nietzschean concepts for Heidegger insofar as they are both pre-technological and pre-phenomenological.