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Automated temporal equilibrium analysis: Verification and synthesis of multi-player games
Artificial Intelligence 287 (C):103353 (2020)
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References found in this work
Extensive games as process models.Johan van Benthem - 2002 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 11 (3):289-313.
Reasoning about coalitional games.Thomas Ågotnes, Wiebe van der Hoek & Michael Wooldridge - 2009 - Artificial Intelligence 173 (1):45-79.
From model checking to equilibrium checking: Reactive modules for rational verification.Julian Gutierrez, Paul Harrenstein & Michael Wooldridge - 2017 - Artificial Intelligence 248 (C):123-157.
Reasoning about equilibria in game-like concurrent systems.Julian Gutierrez, Paul Harrenstein & Michael Wooldridge - 2017 - Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 168 (2):373-403.
Quantified epistemic logics for reasoning about knowledge in multi-agent systems.F. Belardinelli & A. Lomuscio - 2009 - Artificial Intelligence 173 (9-10):982-1013.
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