Persons, Person Stages, Adaptive Preferences, and Historical Wrongs

Journal of Cognition and Neuroethics 9 (2):35-49 (2023)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Let’s say that an act requires Person-Affecting Justification if and only if some alternative would have been better for someone. So, Lucifer breaking Xavier’s back requires Person-Affecting Justification because the alternative would have been better for Xavier. But the story continues: While Lucifer evades justice, Xavier moves on and founds a school for gifted children. Xavier’s deepest values become identified with the school and its community. When authorities catch Lucifer, he claims no Person-Affecting Justification is needed: because the attack set Xavier on his life’s path, it’s no longer true that the alternative would have been better by the standard of what Xavier now values most. An unappealingly paternalistic way to hold Lucifer to account is to discount Xavier’s preferences as merely adaptive. Instead, I propose understanding the persons of Person-Affecting Justification to be not persons but person stages. This allows us to hold Lucifer to account without having to discount Xavier’s actual preferences, and has interesting implications for compensatory justice, including making sense of reparations for historical wrongs.

Links

PhilArchive

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Logical Problems for Lockean Persons.David Welker - 1984 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 21 (1):115-132.
Logical Problems for Lockean Persons.David Welker - 1984 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 21 (1):115-132.
Indiscernible Persons.Eric Steinhart - 2002 - Metaphilosophy 33 (3):300-320.
In defense of adaptive preferences.Donald W. Bruckner - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 142 (3):307 - 324.
The perfectionism of Nussbaum's adaptive preferences.Rosa Terlazzo - 2014 - Journal of Global Ethics 10 (2):183-198.
All the World’s a Stage.Theodore Sider - 1996 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (3):433 – 453.
Adaptive Preferences Are a Red Herring.Dale Dorsey - 2017 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 3 (4):465-484.
Human Persons as Social Entities.Lynne Rudder Baker - 2014 - Journal of Social Ontology 1 (1):77-87.

Analytics

Added to PP
2023-09-29

Downloads
121 (#147,660)

6 months
79 (#60,370)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Mark Edward Greene
University of Delaware

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Commodities and Capabilities.Amartya Sen - 1985 - Oxford University Press India.
Survival and identity.David Lewis - 1976 - In Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (ed.), The Identities of Persons. University of California Press. pp. 17-40.
A treatise of human nature.David Hume - 1739 - In Elizabeth Schmidt Radcliffe, Richard McCarty, Fritz Allhoff & Anand Vaidya (eds.), Late modern philosophy: essential readings with commentary. Wiley-Blackwell.
Future generations: Further problems.Derek Parfit - 1982 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 11 (2):113-172.
Harm and Its Moral Significance.Seana Valentine Shiffrin - 2012 - Legal Theory 18 (3):357-398.

View all 9 references / Add more references