Philosophical Studies 142 (3):307 - 324 (2009)
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Abstract |
An adaptive preference is a preference that is regimented in response to an agent’s set of feasible options. The fabled fox in the sour grapes story undergoes an adaptive preference change. I consider adaptive preferences more broadly, to include adaptive preference formation as well. I argue that many adaptive preferences that other philosophers have cast out as irrational sour-grapes-like preferences are actually fully rational preferences worthy of pursuit. I offer a means of distinguishing rational and worthy adaptive preferences from irrational and unworthy ones. The distinction is based on the agent’s own appraisal of the adaptive preference.
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Keywords | Rational choice Preferences Adaptive preferences Sour grapes Elster Bovens |
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DOI | 10.1007/s11098-007-9188-7 |
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References found in this work BETA
Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person.Harry Frankfurt - 1971 - Journal of Philosophy 68 (1):5-20.
Sour Grapes: Studies in the Subversion of Rationality.Jon Elster - 1983 - Editions De La Maison des Sciences De L'Homme.
Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person.Harry G. Frankfurt - 2003 - In Gary Watson (ed.), Free Will. Oxford University Press.
Sour Grapes: Studies in the Subversion of Rationality.Jon Elster - 1983 - Cambridge University Press.
View all 24 references / Add more references
Citations of this work BETA
False Consciousness for Liberals, Part I: Consent, Autonomy, and Adaptive Preferences.David Enoch - 2020 - Philosophical Review 129 (2):159-210.
Desire-Fulfillment Theory.Chris Heathwood - 2016 - In Guy Fletcher (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Well-Being. Routledge. pp. 135-147.
Pervasive Captivity and Urban Wildlife.Nicolas Delon - 2020 - Ethics, Policy and Environment 23 (2):123-143.
View all 36 citations / Add more citations
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