In defense of adaptive preferences

Philosophical Studies 142 (3):307 - 324 (2009)
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Abstract

An adaptive preference is a preference that is regimented in response to an agent’s set of feasible options. The fabled fox in the sour grapes story undergoes an adaptive preference change. I consider adaptive preferences more broadly, to include adaptive preference formation as well. I argue that many adaptive preferences that other philosophers have cast out as irrational sour-grapes-like preferences are actually fully rational preferences worthy of pursuit. I offer a means of distinguishing rational and worthy adaptive preferences from irrational and unworthy ones. The distinction is based on the agent’s own appraisal of the adaptive preference.

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Author's Profile

Donald W. Bruckner
University of Pittsburgh (PhD)

References found in this work

Freedom of the will and the concept of a person.Harry G. Frankfurt - 1971 - Journal of Philosophy 68 (1):5-20.
A theory of the good and the right.Richard B. Brandt - 1979 - Amherst, N.Y.: Prometheus Books.
Sour grapes: studies in the subversion of rationality.Jon Elster - 1983 - Paris: Editions de la Maison des sciences de l'homme.
Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person.Harry Frankfurt - 1971 - In Gary Watson (ed.), Free Will. Oxford University Press.
Sour Grapes: Studies in the Subversion of Rationality.Jon Elster - 1983 - New York: Cambridge University Press.

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