Dialectica 72 (2):253-273 (2018)

Peter Baumann
Swarthmore College
Big decisions in a person’s life often affect the preferences and standards of a good life which that person’s future self will develop after implementing her decision. This paper argues that in such cases the person might lack any reasons to choose one way rather than the other. Neither preference-based views nor happiness-based views of justified choice offer sufficient help here. The available options are not comparable in the relevant sense and there is no rational choice to make. Thus, ironically, in many of a person’s most important decisions the idea of that person’s good seems to have no application.
Keywords adaptive preferences  big decisions  future selves  the good of a person  happiness  incomparability  rational choice
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DOI 10.1111/1746-8361.12219
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References found in this work BETA

Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person.Harry G. Frankfurt - 1971 - Journal of Philosophy 68 (1):5-20.
Persons, Character, and Morality.Bernard Williams - 1976 - In James Rachels (ed.), Moral Luck: Philosophical Papers 1973–1980. Cambridge University Press.
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The Possibility of Parity.Ruth Chang - 2002 - Ethics 112 (4):659-688.
What You Can't Expect When You're Expecting'.L. A. Paul - 2015 - Res Philosophica 92 (2):1-23.

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Citations of this work BETA

Rational Intransitive Preferences.Peter Baumann - 2022 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 21 (1):3-28.

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