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Against the Mind Argument
Philosophical Studies 148 (2):273-294 (2010)
Abstract
The Mind Argument is an argument for the incompatibility of indeterminism and anyone's having a choice about anything that happens. Peter van Inwagen rejects the Mind Argument not because he is able to point out the flaw in it, but because he accepts both that determinism is incompatible with anyone's having a choice about anything that happens and that it is possible for someone to have a choice about something that happens. In this paper I first diagnose and clear up a confusion in recent discussions of the Mind Argument and then go on to show why it is a bad argumentAuthor's Profile
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Citations of this work
Free will and mystery: looking past the Mind Argument.Seth Shabo - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (2):291-307.
Ciceronov de fato: o helenističkim kondicionalima i slobodi volje.Vladimir Marko - 2023 - Novi Sad: Futura publikacije.
References found in this work
Libertarian Accounts of Free Will.Randolph Clarke - 2003 - New York, US: Oxford University Press USA.
Free will as involving determination and inconceivable without it.R. E. Hobart - 1934 - Mind 43 (169):1-27.
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