Synthese 199 (3-4):8091-8112 (2021)

Authors
Simone Gozzano
Università degli Studi dell'Aquila
Abstract
In this paper I argue that bodily pain, as a phenomenal property, is an essentially and substantial dispositional property. To this end, I maintain that this property is individuated by its phenomenal roles, which can be internal -individuating the property per se- and external -determining further phenomenal or physical properties or states. I then argue that this individuation allows phenomenal roles to be organized in a necessarily asymmetrical net, thereby overcoming the circularity objection to dispositionalism. Finally, I provide reasons to argue that these roles satisfy modal fixity, as posited by Bird, and are not fundamental properties, contra Chalmers’ panpsychism. Thus, bodily pain can be considered a substantial dispositional property entrenched in non-fundamental laws of nature.
Keywords phenomenal properties  phenomenal role  panpsychism  protopansychism  dispositions
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-021-03154-z
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References found in this work BETA

The Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Intention.G. E. M. Anscombe - 1957 - Harvard University Press.
A World of States of Affairs.D. M. Armstrong - 1996 - Cambridge University Press.
Physicalism, or Something Near Enough.Jaegwon Kim - 2005 - Princeton University Press.

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