Phenomenal properties are luminous properties

Synthese 199 (3-4):11001-11022 (2021)
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Abstract

What is the connection between having a phenomenal property and knowing that one has that property? A traditional view on the matter takes the connection to be quite intimate. Whenever one has a phenomenal property, one knows that one does. Recently most authors have denied this traditional view. The goal of this paper is to defend the traditional view. In fact, I will defend something much stronger: I will argue that what it is for a property to be phenomenal is for it to be a property one must know oneself to have when on has it. As we will see, this theory has a number of surprising and welcome upshots, suggesting that the traditional view has been unjustly maligned.

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Author's Profile

Geoffrey Hall
University of Notre Dame (PhD)

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References found in this work

Knowledge and its limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - New York: Oxford University Press.
A Materialist Theory of the Mind.D. M. Armstrong - 1968 - New York: Routledge. Edited by Ted Honderich.
The representational character of experience.David J. Chalmers - 2004 - In Brian Leiter (ed.), The Future for Philosophy. Oxford University Press. pp. 153--181.
Vagueness.Timothy Williamson - 1996 - New York: Routledge.
The Contents of Visual Experience.Susanna Siegel - 2010 - , US: Oxford University Press USA.

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