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The Turing—Good Weight of Evidence Function and Popper's Measure of the Severity of a Test
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 41 (1):143-146 (1990)
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Citations of this work
On argument strength.Niki Pfeifer - 2013 - In Frank Zenker (ed.), Bayesian argumentation. The practical side of probability. Dordrecht, Netherlands: pp. 185-193.
Two Conceptions of Weight of Evidence in Peirce’s Illustrations of the Logic of Science.Jeff Kasser - 2016 - Erkenntnis 81 (3):629-648.
Probabilistic support, probabilistic induction and bayesian confirmation theory.Andres Rivadulla - 1994 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 45 (2):477-483.
The frame problem: An AI fairy tale. [REVIEW]Kevin B. Korb - 1998 - Minds and Machines 8 (3):317-351.
References found in this work
Logical Foundations of Probability.Ernest H. Hutten - 1950 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 16 (3):205-207.
Good Thinking: The Foundations of Probability and its Applications.Irving John Good - 1983 - Univ Minnesota Pr.
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