Is There a Value Problem?

In Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Epistemic Value. Oxford University Press. pp. 42--59 (2009)
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Abstract

The value problem in epistemology is rooted in a commonsense intuition to the effect that knowledge is more valuable than true belief. Call this the “guiding intuition.” The guiding intuition generates a problem in light of two additional considerations. The first is that knowledge is (roughly) justified or warranted true belief.[1] The second is that on certain popular accounts of justification or warrant (e.g. reliabilism), its value is apparently instrumental to and hence derivative from the value of true belief.[2] But if knowledge is justified true belief and the value of justification is derivative from that of true belief, how is it that knowledge is more valuable than true belief?

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2009-01-28

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Jason Baehr
Loyola Marymount University

Citations of this work

Curiosity was Framed.Dennis Whitcomb - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (3):664-687.
In Defense of Veritistic Value Monism.Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij - 2013 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (1):19-40.
Against swamping.J. Adam Carter & Benjamin Jarvis - 2012 - Analysis 72 (4):690-699.
The Value of Knowledge and The Test of Time.Miranda Fricker - 2009 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 64:121-138.

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