Philosophical Studies 115 (1):1-31 (2003)

Authors
Brian Weatherson
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor
Abstract
Intuitively, Gettier cases are instances of justified true beliefs that are not cases of knowledge. Should we therefore conclude that knowledge is not justified true belief? Only if we have reason to trust intuition here. But intuitions are unreliable in a wide range of cases. And it can be argued that the Gettier intuitions have a greater resemblance to unreliable intuitions than to reliable intuitions. Whats distinctive about the faulty intuitions, I argue, is that respecting them would mean abandoning a simple, systematic and largely successful theory in favour of a complicated, disjunctive and idiosyncratic theory. So maybe respecting the Gettier intuitions was the wrong reaction, we should instead have been explaining why we are all so easily misled by these kinds of cases.
Keywords Gettier  intuitions  JTB analysis
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DOI 10.1023/A:1024961917413
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References found in this work BETA

Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
Philosophical Investigations.Ludwig Josef Johann Wittgenstein - 1953 - New York, NY, USA: Wiley-Blackwell.
Studies in the Way of Words.Herbert Paul Grice - 1989 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

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Competence to Know.Lisa Miracchi - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (1):29-56.

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