Persons, Animals, and Psychological Unity

Philosophical Studies (forthcoming)
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In this paper I consider whether psychological unity can moderate moral status. I first explicate a hybrid view on which non-person animals have a utilitarian moral status and persons have a deontological moral status. I then discuss Jeff McMahan's (2002) concept of psychological unity, and I motivate the view that differences in psychological unity might affect the strength of our reasons against harming different individuals. Ultimately, however, I reject the claim that differences in moral status can be explained by differences in psychological unity.



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Molly Gardner
University of Florida

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