Evidentialism and pragmatic constraints on outright belief

In Jeremy Fantl, Matthew McGrath & Ernest Sosa (eds.), Contemporary epistemology: an anthology. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley (2018)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

This article has no associated abstract. (fix it)

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,503

External links

  • This entry has no external links. Add one.
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Evidentialism and pragmatic constraints on outright belief.Dorit Ganson - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 139 (3):441 - 458.
Two Arguments for Evidentialism.Jonathan Way - 2016 - Philosophical Quarterly 66 (265):805-818.
A Short Refutation of Strict Normative Evidentialism.Andrew E. Reisner - 2014 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy (5):1-9.
Sanctifying evidentialism.Horace Fairlamb - 2010 - Religious Studies 46 (1):61-76.
Evidence, pragmatics, and justification.Jeremy Fantl & Matthew McGrath - 2002 - Philosophical Review 111 (1):67-94.
Pragmatic Reasons for Belief.Andrew Reisner - 2018 - In Daniel Star (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press.
Conceptual evidentialism.Inga Nayding - 2011 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (1):39-65.
The duty to believe according to the evidence.Allen Wood - 2008 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 63 (1-3):7-24.

Analytics

Added to PP
2022-12-04

Downloads
0

6 months
0

Historical graph of downloads

Sorry, there are not enough data points to plot this chart.
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Dorit Ganson
Oberlin College

Citations of this work

Belief and Credence: Why the Attitude-Type Matters.Elizabeth Grace Jackson - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (9):2477-2496.
Credal pragmatism.Jie Gao - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (6):1595-1617.
Belief, Credence, and the Preface Paradox.Alex Worsnip - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (3):549-562.
Credence as doxastic tendency.Dominik Kauss - 2020 - Synthese 197 (10):4495-4518.
Knowledge and Action: What Depends on What?Itamar Weinshtock Saadon - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Epistemology.

View all 17 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references