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A naturalist-phenomenal realist response to Block's harder problem
Philosophical Issues 13 (1):163-204 (2003)
Abstract
widely held commitments: to phenomenal realism and to naturalism. Phenomenal realism is the view that we are phenomenally consciousness, and that there is no a priori or armchair sufficient condition for phenomenal consciousness that can be stated in nonphenomenal terms . 1,2 Block points out that while phenomenal realists rejectAuthor's Profile
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Citations of this work
The search for neural correlates of consciousness.Jakob Hohwy - 2007 - Philosophy Compass 2 (3):461–474.
There is an epistemic problem in animal consciousness research.Aida Roige - 2023 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 1.
How Can Brains in Vats Experience a Spatial World? A Puzzle for Internalists.Adam Pautz - 2019 - In Blockheads!
Consciousness, type physicalism, and inference to the best explanation.Brian P. McLaughlin - 2010 - Philosophical Issues 20 (1):266-304.
How Philosophy of Mind Can Shape the Future.Susan Schneider & Pete Mandik - 2018 - In Amy Kind (ed.), Philosophy of Mind in the Twentieth and Twenty-First Centuries: The History of the Philosophy of Mind, Volume 6. New York: Routledge. pp. 303-319.
References found in this work
The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory (2nd edition).David J. Chalmers - 1996 - Oxford University Press.
Naming and Necessity: Lectures Given to the Princeton University Philosophy Colloquium.Saul A. Kripke - 1980 - Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Edited by Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel.
Facing up to the problem of consciousness.David Chalmers - 1995 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 2 (3):200-19.
From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis.Frank Jackson - 1998 - New York: Oxford University Press.
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