Abstract

It has widely been recognized that Kant's critical philosophy emerged from his reading of Hume's skeptical arguments about causation. One of the primary goals of this dissertation is to present a careful analysis of the major features of Humean skepticism, particularly regarding causation. The achievement of this goal in turn facilitates a superior understanding of Kant's philosophy. In my examination of Hume's writings on causation, I also expose a connection between these skeptical issues surrounding causation and the problem of the external world. The identical connection resurfaces in Kant's First Critique, and his discussion of the external world constitutes a vital component of his response to skepticism. ;I begin by examining skepticism and causation in Hume's Treatise . I identify two different kinds of skepticism. "Epistemological skepticism" undermines justification, and is exemplified by Hume's attack on the principle of sufficient reason, as well as his more famous problem of induction. "Conceptual skepticism" involves an attack on the meaningfulness of an idea. Hume's primary goal of championing naturalism requires that he defend epistemological skepticism about causal inferences, while avoiding conceptual skepticism about the concept of cause, I also show that Hume's evasion of conceptual skepticism forces him to a position notably similar to Kant's. ;I then show that Hume's theory of causation is closely tied to his treatment of the external world. Here Hume is unable to avoid conceptual skepticism about the concept of body, consequently most human beliefs are meaningless. This skeptical conclusion undermines Hume's naturalism, and constitutes a reductio of Hume's empiricist theory of meaning. ;Next I reconstruct Kant's defense of the principle of sufficient reason. I show that he proves the hypothetical claim that if one draws a distinction between a representation of succession and a succession of representations, then these successive events must satisfy the principle of sufficient reason. ;Completing the proof, Kant shows in the Refutation of Idealism and in related writings that the antecedent must be satisfied. He argues, in connection with a theory of time determination, that it is not possible to arrange our mental states temporally without our experience's being of genuinely external objects