Kim examines the fundamental tenets of Immanuel Kant’s theory of morality structural-methodological point of view to highlight the activities of reason vis-à-vis the blind forces of brute nature. The study provides new perspective on Kant's thought to benefit studies of epistemology, modern philosophy, moral theory and philosophy, and ethics.

A substantial reason behind the Confucian canonization of the Yijing can be located in some underlying patterns of thinking common to both the Yijing and The Analects; especially relevant here is the doctrine of rectification of names. In particular, I analyze the fundamental structure of the Yijing by means of the names and symbols standing in unique semantic/semiotic relations to the world, and I go on to suggest that this is what is importantly entailed by the doctrine of the rectification (...) of names when the latter is understood by means of the perlocutionary function of the prescriptive language. (shrink)

1. Self-Love, Sociability, and Autonomy: Some Presuppositions of Kant’s Account of Practical Law -- Jeffrey Edwards // 2. The Virtuous Republic: Rousseau and Kant on the Relation between Civil and Moral Religion -- Günter Zöller // 3. Kant, Pistorius, and Accessing Reality -- Halla Kim // 4. Kant, Fichte, and Transcendental Idealism -- Tom Rockmore // 5. Fichte’s Project: The Jena Wissenschaftslehre -- Daniel Breazeale // 6. The Unity of Reason in Kant and Fichte -- Steven Hoeltzel // 7. Idealism (...) and Nihilism -- Benjamin D. Crowe // 8. Fichte and Semantic Holism -- Yukio Irie // 9. “In and Of Itself Nothing is Finite”: Schelling’s Nature (or So-called Identity) Philosophy -- Michael Vater // 10. Conceptual Schemes, Realism, and Idealism: A Hegelian Approach to Concepts and Reality -- Christian Tewes . (shrink)

1. Kant on the “Conditions of the Possibility” of Experience -- Claude Piché // 2. Plato and Kantian Transcendental Constructivism -- Tom Rockmore // 3. Kant and Fichte on the Notion of (Transcendental) Freedom -- Violetta L. Waibel // 4. Fichte, Transcendental Ontology, and the Ethics of Belief -- Steven Hoeltzel // 5. Transcendental Philosophy as “Therapy of the Mind”: Fichte’s “Facts of Consciousness” Lectures -- Benjamin D. Crowe // 6. From Transcendental Philosophy to Hegel’s Developmental Method -- William F. (...) Bristow // 7. How Transcendental Is Cohen’s Critical Idealism? -- Halla Kim // 8. Heidegger’s Failure to Overcome Transcendental Philosophy -- Eric S. Nelson // 9. Others as the Ground of Our Existence: Levinas, Løgstrup, and Transcendental Arguments in Ethics -- Robert Stern // 10. Raising Validity Claims for Reasons: Transcendental Reflection in Apel’s Argumentative Discourse -- Matthias Kettner // 11. Transcendental Arguments Based on Question-Answer Contradictions -- Yukio Irie // 12. Consequences of the Transcendental-Pragmatic Consensus Theory of Truth -- Michihito Yoshime // 13. On Jürgen Habermas’s Cognitive Theory of Morality -- Yasuyuki Funaba . (shrink)

In his recent book, Jae-Seong Lee argues that not only Eastern thoughts but also Western philosophy lead us to transcend our ordinary, binary, reflexive thought and become one with the truth, namely, Emptiness, or the true self. But this aspect has not been thoroughly considered in Western metaphysics. After considering Heidegger’s failure to get to the bottom of transcendence through his “Dasein,” Lee looks to the French postmodern ethicists, in particular, Levinas, in this regard. Just like the Mahayana Buddhist philosopher (...) Nāgārjuna did almost two thousand years earlier, Lee suggests that Levinas too may have hit upon the insight that genuine subjectivity can be reached through an openness to the Other as the wholly exterior. Throughout the entire book, Jae-Seong Lee shows a strong interest in postmodern ethics, Daoism, Buddhism, theology, and literature, but in the end, he concludes that Buddhist philosophy, with its focus on Emptiness, would be the best approach to a merging of Eastern and Western Ways of thinking in our search for the ultimate and absolute. Finally, Lee suggests that the general philosophical theory he introduces and develops actually works for literary works including the Book of Job, Count Dracula and Frankenstein. (shrink)

The third section of the Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals presents a particularly acute interpretative problem that has perplexed generations of Kant commentators. Having devoted the two preceding sections of the work to identifying the supreme principle of morality, Kant, in this section, turns to the task of justifying the principle for rational yet sensually affected beings like humans. However, in the middle of this famous “deduction,” he suddenly confesses that “there is a hidden circle” from which “there is (...) no escape.” Kant’s abrupt confession of the circle leaves the reader deeply puzzled, partly because Kant has so confidently presented his arguments for our subjection to the constraints of the supreme principle of morality up to that point, and partly because no clues are readily apparent as to what the mistake in the arguments might be. Where is the circle located? In this paper I tackle Kant’s problem of the hidden circle in the Foundations. In particular, I will identify and critically discuss three influential interpretations of the fallacy of circularity and offer an alternative reading of Kant’s way out of the problem. (shrink)

The third section of the Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals presents a particularly acute interpretative problem that has perplexed generations of Kant commentators. Having devoted the two preceding sections of the work to identifying the supreme principle of morality, Kant, in this section, turns to the task of justifying the principle for rational yet sensually affected beings like humans. However, in the middle of this famous “deduction,” he suddenly confesses that “there is a hidden circle” from which “there is (...) no escape.” Kant’s abrupt confession of the circle leaves the reader deeply puzzled, partly because Kant has so confidently presented his arguments for our subjection to the constraints of the supreme principle of morality up to that point, and partly because no clues are readily apparent as to what the mistake in the arguments might be. Where is the circle located? In this paper I tackle Kant’s problem of the hidden circle in the Foundations. In particular, I will identify and critically discuss three influential interpretations of the fallacy of circularity and offer an alternative reading of Kant’s way out of the problem. (shrink)

Spinoza’s stance against “bad” universals is well known but his own view on “good” universals is not obvious. In this paper we examine the ontological status of general terms in Spinoza against the background of his metaphysical ontology. We then move onto his view of universals in his discussions of the three kind of knowledge. I argue that Spinoza’s view may be best characterized as trope-conceptualism. Universals are, considered in things themselves, nothing but tropes, i.e., fully particularized properties of individual (...) objects. In particular, I claim that what Spinoza calls “attributes” in his grand scheme of ontology are tropes, of which we can have “adequate” ideas. Spinoza’s theory is a lot more delicate and sophisticated than is usually construed. (shrink)

This paper is an attempt to understand the main characteristics of the three transitions that Kant makes in his Groundwork in view of his professed purpose of grounding pure moral philosophy. In particular, I show that the method of transition is devised as a way in which Kant can secure the a priori basis of morality in his campaign against naturalism in ethics.