Abstract

With recent publications by Norton, MacIntyre, Fogelin and others, the issue of Hume's moral skepticism has become a matter of concern. Contrary to the views of Norton and MacIntyre, I argue in my dissertation that Hume is a moral skeptic because his moral theory follows an explicit skeptical methodology or pattern established in his theory of the understanding. In the first chapter I identify an antecedent and consequential skeptical methodology in Book I of the Treatise. The antecedent type is characterized by a three step pattern where, first, boundaries of the understanding are set, second, a theory is defended, and, third, a rival "vulgar" theory is refuted. I then argue that the theories Hume defends are ones which proceed from strong natural propensities. Hume's consequential skepticism begins excessively when he shows his own theories to ultimately be contradictory. The problems remain theoretical, however, and he prescribes no doubt. This analysis of skepticism in Book I provides the basis for both identifying and understanding the skeptical features of Hume's moral theory. As a theory of moral sentiment, Hume's account of morality has its epistemological foundation in his theory of the passions. Chapter Two exposes this foundation. In Chapters Three and Four I argue that four features of his moral theory are skeptical in the antecedent sense: first, his denial that a spectator's moral approval is a rational judgment, second, that an agent's moral actions are initiated by a caused or determined will, third that some virtues are matters of convention, and fourth, that some virtues have an apparent nonmoral character. With each of these issues I show how Hume's arguments exhibit the three steps of the antecedent skeptical pattern, and that his theories rest on strong principles of the imagination. In Chapter Five I defend a developmental interpretation of Hume's consequential moral skepticism. I argue that when initially writing the Treatise Hume believed his theories of the passions and morals were free from contradiction. I show further that he changed his mind about this in the Appendix, and that his later moral Enquiry exhibits consequential moral skepticism. I end by noting the metaethical consequences of Hume's moral skepticism.