Canadian Journal of Philosophy 46 (2):228-247 (2016)

Bob Fischer
Texas State University
We have some justified beliefs about modal matters. A modal epistemology should explain what’s involved in our having that justification. Given that we’re realists about modality, how should we expect that explanation to go? In the first part of this essay, I suggest an answer to this question based on an analogy with games. Then, I outline a modal epistemology that fits with that answer. According to a theory-based epistemology of modality, you justifiably believe that p if you justifiably believe a theory that says that p and you believe p on the basis of that theory
Keywords modal epistemology  semantic view of theories  modal skepticism
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DOI 10.1080/00455091.2016.1159121
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References found in this work BETA

On the Plurality of Worlds.David Lewis - 1986 - Wiley-Blackwell.
Laws and Symmetry.Bas C. van Fraassen - 1989 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Putting Modal Metaphysics First.Antonella Mallozzi - 2018 - Synthese (Suppl 8):1-20.

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