Omniscience, Freedom, and Dependence

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):346-367 (2014)
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Abstract

Several theorists (Merricks, Westphal, and McCall) have recently claimed to offer a novel way to respond to the dilemma of freedom and foreknowledge, rooted in Molina's insight that God's beliefs depend on what we do, rather than the other way around. In this paper we argue that these responses either beg the question, or else are dressed-up versions of Ockhamism.

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Author Profiles

Neal Tognazzini
Western Washington University
John Fischer
University of California, Riverside

Citations of this work

Ability, Foreknowledge, and Explanatory Dependence.Philip Swenson - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (4):658-671.
The Independence Solution to the Problem of Theological Fatalism.Ryan Wasserman - 2022 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 104 (1):66-77.
Freedom, Foreknowledge, and Dependence: A Dialectical Intervention.Taylor W. Cyr & Andrew Law - 2020 - American Philosophical Quarterly 57 (2):145-154.
From the fixity of the past to the fixity of the independent.Andrew Law - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (4):1301-1314.
Atemporalism and dependence.Taylor W. Cyr - 2020 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 87 (2):149-164.

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References found in this work

An Essay on Free Will.Peter Van Inwagen - 1983 - New York: Oxford University Press.
God, Time, and Knowledge.William Hasker - 1989 - Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
The Problem of Evil.Peter van Inwagen - 2007 - Philosophical Quarterly 57 (229):696-698.
Divine omniscience and voluntary action.Nelson Pike - 1965 - Philosophical Review 74 (1):27-46.

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