American Philosophical Quarterly 57 (2):145-154 (2020)

Authors
Taylor W. Cyr
Samford University
Andrew Law
University of Southern California
Abstract
Recently, several authors have utilized the notion of dependence to respond to the traditional argument for the incompatibility of freedom and divine foreknowledge. However, proponents of this response have not always been so clear in specifying where the incompatibility argument goes wrong, which has led to some unfounded objections to the response. We remedy this dialectical confusion by clarifying both the dependence response itself and its interaction with the standard incompatibility argument. Once these clarifications are made, it becomes clear both (1.) that the dependence response does not beg the question against the proponent of the incompatibility argument and (2.) that the dependence response advances the dialectic whether it is developed as a version of Ockhamism or as a version of multiple-pasts compatibilism.
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References found in this work BETA

Divine Omniscience and Voluntary Action.Nelson Pike - 1965 - Philosophical Review 74 (1):27-46.
Ability, Foreknowledge, and Explanatory Dependence.Philip Swenson - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (4):658-671.
Truth and Freedom.Trenton Merricks - 2009 - Philosophical Review 118 (1):29-57.
Our Fate: Essays on God and Free Will.John Martin Fischer - 2016 - Oxford University Press USA.
Soft Facts and Ontological Dependence.Patrick Todd - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (3):829-844.

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Citations of this work BETA

From the Fixity of the Past to the Fixity of the Independent.Andrew Law - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (4):1301-1314.
Foreknowledge and Free Will.Linda Zagzebski - 2011 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy:online.
The Independence Solution to the Problem of Theological Fatalism.Ryan Wasserman - 2022 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 104 (1):66-77.
Dependence and the Freedom to Do Otherwise.Taylor Cyr - forthcoming - Faith and Philosophy.

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