Joint Action without Mutual Beliefs

Kriterion - Journal of Philosophy 35 (1):47-70 (2021)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Joint action among human beings is characterized by using elaborate cognitive feats, such as representing the mental states of others about a certain state of affairs. It is still debated how these capacities evolved in the hominid lineage. I suggest that the consolidation of a shared practice over time can foster the predictability of other’s behavior. This might facilitate the evolutionary passage from inferring what others might know by simply seeing them and what they are viewing towards a mutual awareness of each other’s beliefs. I will examine the case for cooperative hunting in one chimpanzee community and argue that it is evidence that they have the potential to achieve common ground, suggesting that the consolidation of a practice might have supported the evolution of higher social cognition in the hominid lineage.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,752

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Joint Action without Mutual Beliefs.Giacomo Figà Talamanca - 2021 - Kriterion - Journal of Philosophy 35 (1):47-70.
Situating Norms and Jointness of Social Interaction.Patrizio Lo Presti - 2013 - Cosmos and History : The Journal of Natural and Social Philosophy 9 (1):225-248.
Joint action and recursive consciousness of consciousness.Sebastian Rödl - 2015 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 14 (4):769-779.
Prediction in Joint Action: What, When, and Where.Natalie Sebanz & Guenther Knoblich - 2009 - Topics in Cognitive Science 1 (2):353-367.
Let’s pretend!: Children and joint action.Deborah Tollefsen - 2005 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 35 (1):75-97.
Parallels between joint action and biological individuality.Cedric Paternotte - 2015 - In Thomas Pradeu & Alexandre Guay (eds.), Individuals Across The Sciences. Oxford University Press.
Joint know-how.Jonathan Birch - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (12):3329–3352.
Joint Action and Development.Stephen Andrew Butterfill - 2012 - Philosophical Quarterly 62 (246):23-47.
How does it feel to act together?Elisabeth Pacherie - 2014 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13 (1):25-46.

Analytics

Added to PP
2022-05-24

Downloads
11 (#1,133,540)

6 months
6 (#510,793)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Giacomo Figà-Talamanca
Aachen University of Technology

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations