Philosophical Studies 176 (12):3329–3352 (2019)

Authors
Jonathan Birch
London School of Economics
Abstract
When two agents engage in a joint action, such as rowing together, they exercise joint know-how. But what is the relationship between the joint know-how of the two agents and the know-how each agent possesses individually? I construct an “active mutual enablement” account of this relationship, according to which joint know-how arises when each agent knows how to predict, monitor, and make failure-averting adjustments in response to the behaviour of the other agent, while actively enabling the other to make such adjustments. I defend the AME account from three objections, and I then use this account as the platform for an examination of the reducibility of joint know-how to joint propositional knowledge. A summative account of joint propositional knowledge is incompatible with the reduction of joint know-how to joint propositional knowledge, whereas a distributive account is not. I close by highlighting some open questions the AME account brings into view concerning the evolutionary origin and scaling up of joint know-how.
Keywords know-how  joint action  collective knowledge
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Reprint years 2018, 2019
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-018-1176-6
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References found in this work BETA

A Natural History of Human Morality.Michael Tomasello (ed.) - 2016 - Harvard University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Knowledge How.Jeremy Fantl - 2012 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
The Metaphysics of Practical Rationality: Intentional and Deontic Cognition.Preston Stovall - 2021 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association (4):1-20.
Social Epistemology and Knowing-How.Yuri Cath - forthcoming - In Jennifer Lackey & Aidan McGlynn (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Social Epistemology. Oxford University Press.

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