Unsettled Thoughts: A Theory of Degrees of Rationality, by Julia Staffel

Mind 131 (522):724-733 (2022)
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10.1093/mind/fzaa070

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Unsettled Thoughts: A Theory of Degrees of Rationality.Julia Staffel - 2019 - Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.
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Claire Field
University of Stirling

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References found in this work

Accuracy and the Laws of Credence.Richard Pettigrew - 2016 - New York, NY.: Oxford University Press UK.
Higher‐Order Evidence and the Limits of Defeat.Maria Lasonen-Aarnio - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):314-345.
Higher Order Evidence.David Christensen - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (1):185-215.
A nonpragmatic vindication of probabilism.James M. Joyce - 1998 - Philosophy of Science 65 (4):575-603.

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