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Unsettled Thoughts: A Theory of Degrees of Rationality
Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press (2019)
Abstract
How should thinkers cope with uncertainty? Julia Staffel breaks new ground in the study of rationality by answering this question and many others. She also explains how it is better to be less irrational, because less irrational degrees of belief are generally more accurate and better at guiding our actions.Author's Profile
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Expressivism, Normative Uncertainty, and Arguments for Probabilism.Julia Staffel - 2019 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 6.
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