In defence of a correspondence theory of truth

Abstract

I want to show that truth is an important concept, and that it can be explained. However, we must deal with what are called ‘deflationist’ concepts of truth first. Deflationism is the view that there is nothing more to be said about truth once a semantic theory for the truth-predicate (such as Tarski's) has been provided.

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Deflationist Theories of Truth, Meaning, and Content.Stephen Schiffer - 1997 - In Bob Hale, Crispin Wright & Alexander Miller (eds.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Language. Chichester, West Sussex, UK: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 463–490.
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Deflating Deflationism.Bradley Philip Armour-Garb - 1999 - Dissertation, City University of New York

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